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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last forty years world’s economy has experienced an unparallel process of
globalization both in terms of goods traded, both in terms of capital movement and
financial exchanges. For what concerns the financial sector, intended in a broad
sense as the ensemble of banks, insurances, funds and so on, the willingness to
attempt an even higher level of risk diversification , the advances in terms of finan-
cial engeneering (for example securitization) and the diffusion on large scale of new
types of contracts (such as derivatives, credit default swaps and collateralised debt
obligations) , have caused an increase in the level of complexity and connectivity of
the finalncial system, with the result that today’s financial insitutions are directly
or indirectly connected with many more counterparts (within the financial system
itself and with the real side of the economy) all over the world than few decades
ago.
This reduction of the “world’s size” from an XXL to a SMALL (Friedman, 2006)
has brought, togheter with numerous advantages, also some potential drawbacks,
which, as far as concern the financial system, have become clearer with the financial
crises started in late 2007 in the United States.
In that case, the initial local shock represented by the inability to pay their home
mortgages by hundreds of american households, has ended up into a global financial
crises, then turned into an economics crises at world scale. The most famous and
striking event of this crises, even at the level of collective imaginary, has been the
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failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008.
That default has not been isolated, but it has been followed by a series of deafults
and bailouts all over the world, from United States (AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
Bearn Sterns, Merrill Lynch, Countrywide Financial just to name a few) to Unitied
Kingdom (for instance Northen Rock), from Ireland (Anglo Irish Bank) to Spain
(Bankia and Caja de Ahorros Castilla La Mancha between the others), from Iceland
(for example Landsbanki, Glitnir, Kaupthing Bank) to Netherlands (ABN AMRO).
This sequence of bailouts has shown how the intricate network of claims and obli-
gations links the financial institutions all over the world, so that the functioning of
one institution can affect the survival of another, appearently far and not influenced,
institution (in many respects resembling the so called butterfly effect), or even be
crucial for the whole system (too big to fail argument). The high degree of connc-
tivity among banks, hedge funds, insurance companies and in general of financial
intermediaries which has been reached by the modern financial system, turned out
to be a key determinant for the outbreak of a systemic crises, that is of a crises
affecting the whole system.
As pointed out by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) in their study of financial crises, what
happened in 2008 was not an exception; paraphrasing the title of their book, “that
time was not different”. Indeed, by looking at the data that they have collected,
banking crises have revealed to be a periodic event of economies: from 1800 to 2010
United States have experienced 31 banking crises1, United Kingdom 25, France and
Germany 16, Italy 18, Japan 17 (Reinhart, 2010), (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010).
Given the relative high frequency of banking crises and the enormous costs related
to them for taxpayers, governments (public debt) and the economy as a whole (for
instance loss of potential output), a better understanding of how crises occur and
which can be their cosequences seems required, both to better forecast them, both
to develope policy prescriptions in order to prevent them.
1In (Reinhart, 2010) the two authors define a banking crises as an event in which there are “bank
runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takover by the public sector of one or more financial
institutions and if there are no runs, the closure, merging, take-over or large-scale government
assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a
string of similar outcomes for other financial instituitions”
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As pointed out in the previous paragraphs, the structure of modern financial sys-
tem is characterized by an ensable of different agents highly interconnected between
them by their reciprocal claims and obligations, which give rise to an intricate web
of debit/credit relations that link the balance sheets of a wide variety of intermedi-
aries (Gai & Kapadia, 2010). A natural way to think at this system is to see it as a
complex network, that is as “a collection of points joined together in pairs by lines.
[...] points are referred to as vertices or nodes and the lines are referred to as edges”
((Newman, 2010) p. 1).
The developements in the theory of networks of the last twenty years and its re-
cent application to economics and finance have revelaed how much this approach is
well suitable in modelling financial system and have gave rise to a growing body of
literature on financial networks. The present work engages in this filed of research
by developing a simple model of financial network and performing a computational
study to assess if and to what extent a real shock, such as the bankruptcy of a firm
(due for example to a slump in the aggregate demand), can be transmitted to the
financial system and determine a systemic crisis.
The work draws from the growing body of literature regarding the contagion in fi-
nancial network, which has flourished in the recent years, however, differently from
the majority of the studies of this kind, the present comprises a formalization of the
real side of the economy represented by firms 2 and of the interaction between banks
and firms.
One of the main benchmarks of the work is the model provided by Gai and Kapa-
dia (2010): following these two authors the financial network is constructed on the
basis of mutual claims and obligations between financial instituions. However, the
model presented here extends the one of Gai and Kapadia extends the one of Gai
2In what follows it is assumed for simplicity that the real side of the economy is constituted only
by firms, however for they way in which firms are modelled in this work it would also be possible
to think at them as households or as households and firms without altering the analysis or making
any conceptual mistake. However, we decided to consider and to call them firms because there
are more data available on the defaults of firms rather than on houselhods, which are useful to
parametrising the model; even more important is that, nothwithstanding the fact the the subprime
crisis has been triggered by the “defaults” of hoseholds, firms are bigger than hoseholds in terms
of assets and loans received and therefore are likely to be more relevant in determining a crisis.
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and Kapadia by adding a second layer in the network structure which represents the
real side of the economy through firms: in this new set up, exogenous shocks are
no longer represented by a “big” single failure of a bank, but by a multiplicity of
“small” shocks hitting different banks, represented by the default of a given number
of firms; therefore a priori we do not have the guarantee that the banking system
will be affected (for example by triggering a cascade of banks defaults) by a real
shock.
The model developed departs from the baseline model of Gai and Kapadia (2010)
also in some others respects, such as heterogeneity of banks’ assets and number of
inter-bank links, as it will be discussed more in detail in the next chapters. The
work studies, under different settings and values of the paramenters, how shocks
propagate through the financial network, which is the resilience of such a system
and to what extent the final outcome depends on finer details like the assumptions
about balance sheet composition.
Although the model that will be presented in the next chapters is a very stylized
representation of reality and the interplay between the financial and the real part
may appear oversimplified, it is able to provide some policy suggestions in order to
analyse the financial stability, to increase the resilience of the system and to reduce
the probability and the spread of systemic crises. Moreover, notwithstanding its
limits, it represents a first attempt to link two worlds which have been too often
treated separately, constituting a useful starting point for further research.
12
Chapter 2
Literature review
In this chapter we will make a short review of the literature on contagion in financial
networks, doing a brief history of the main theoretical and empirical achievements.
We will also give an overview of the most relevant models developed and of their
features and findings, devoting greater attention to the ones which have represented
a particular important reference point for this work.
Even if the network applications to financial systems constitute a relatively recent
field of research, the issues related with this strand of literature are already many
and diverse, therefore to provide a complete tretment of all of them would be im-
possibile and it is not the aim of the work3.
For our purposes it is just worth noting that the model presented here leaves out
several issues regarding network modellization of financial systems, such as the en-
dogenous network formation, the optimal network structure and the choice of the
network model. Those issues, however important, have been left apart from the dis-
cussion for three main reasons: first, to keep things as simple as possible, avoiding
excessive complication of the model, which would have resulted in too long compu-
tational times; second, to preserve some form of comparability with the benchmark
models; third, because there is no unanimous consensus between scholars on what
3For a survey on this topics see (Upper, 2007)
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best reflects empirical reality4 5.
Before proceeding to the next section, the reader which is not familiar with the
network terminology that will be used from now on, can refer to Appendix A on
network theory for clarifications.
2.1 Network application to financial systems
Over the last fifteen years, with a faster pace after the cirses of 2008, network models
began to be extensively applied to study the resilience of banking systems (Allen &
Babus, 2009; Hasman, 2013).
The pioneering work in the field is the one of Allen and Gale (Allen & Gale, 2000)
who were the first to show how a complete network structure is able to absorb id-
iosyncratic shocks hitting a single bank, while incomplete networks might allow the
spread throughout the system.
In their work financial contagion is modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon and it
is caused by liquidity preference shocks. In their framework the possibility of con-
tagion depends strongly on the completeness of the structure of network: complete
network structures are more robust than incomplete structures
After their work, many other research has been carried out, mainly thoretical, but
also empirical, nothwitstanding the difficulties in obtaining data.
For example (Nier et al. , 2007) study a interbank random network of 25 banks
to analyses how systemic risk depends on the structure of the banking system and
show that, all else equal, contagion is a non-monotonic function of the number of
interbank connections.
More complex model and different network structures, which aim at mimic more
closely some emipirically observed fetures of financial systems have then been used,
4For example there is no clear evidence on which structure exhibits real world banking networks:
although some real-world banking networks may have core-periphery structures and tiering, such
as the Austrian (Boss et al. , 2004) and German (Craig & Von Peter, 2014) interbank markets,
the empirical data are limited.
5For a discussion of these topics see (Leitner, 2005; Gale & Kariv, 2007; Castiglionesi & Navarro,
2007; Allen & Babus, 2009).
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for example the one developed by (Montagna & Lux, 2013). In this model there are
two interesting aspects: first, the analysis on the dynamics of contagion that the
two authors perform, which studies in detail what happens in each default cascades,
how many banks fail and which is the aggregate loss. A second interesting aspect
is that they assume a scale-free network with preferential attachment, where the
probability of having a link is dependet on the number of links already active for a
node. In other words networks are produced according to a fitness algorithm, able
to reproduce the disassortative behavior, the power laws in the degree distributions
and the power laws in the distribution of bank sizes which have been frequanlty
documented by empirical studies.
Another relevant model, which is the one more close to the approch that we will
use later on, is the one recently published by (Anand et al. , 2013), in which for the
first time, a real shock is introduced in this type of models.
Indeed this paper tries to link the real and the financial side of the economy exam-
ining the role of macroeconomic fluctuations, assets market liquidity and network
structure in determining contagion and aggregate loss. The results show the impor-
tance of fire-sales externalities and feedback effects due to the reduction of credit on
the economy and the mortality rate of the firms.
To summarize, the literature on financial contagion has enucleated a series of find-
ings and interesting aspects. First of all two different type of causes of contagion
have been pointed out: in contagion occurred through indirect balance-sheet linkages
and contagion due to direct linkages. Second, an ambiguous role of diversification
has been observed. Third, the degree of connectivity of the system has been deteced
as a key determinant of contagion. Finally different initial shocks can be possible
and they have different effects on the systems.
We will now describe more in details the model developed in (Gai & Kapadia, 2010),
since it will represent our main benchmark point trough all the chapters.
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2.2 The model of Gai and Kapadia (2010)
The present section summarizes the main features of the model of Gai and Kapadia
(2010), therefore it necessarily draws a lot from the original paper, in particular
from section 2 and subsection 3.1.
The paper is one of the most cited in current literature and represents one of the
major contributions to this field, as well as our main starting point in the builiding
our model.
The two authors develop a model6 of contagion in financial networks which studies
how an initial exogenous shock, represented by the bankrupt of a bank, is trans-
mitted thorugh the network and which is the likelihood and extent of contagion for
different degrees of connectivity, recovery rates and levels of liquidity risk.
The model manage to capture two key sources of contagion: the so called direct con-
tagion, which goes through the interbank channels, and the indirect contagion, that
affects the non-interbank assets inscribed in banks’ balance sheet (such as mortgages,
bonds, shares). The first source of contagion reflects the direct influence which the
default of a bank can have on linked banks, while the second source reflects the
indirect influence of a fall in the price (and so in the value)7 of assets owned by
banks led by the failure of others, not necessarily linked, banks.
The authors consider a financial network with arbitrary structure in which N finan-
cial intermediaries8 - banks for simplicity - are randomly connected one with the
other through their reciprocal claims.
In the view of graph theory banks represent the nodes of the network and the
credit/debit relationships represent the links (or edges) between banks. Links are
weighted for the value of the claim/duty reported in the balance sheet of the bank.
In particular, if a bank i has a credit toward a bank j, this credit is represented by
6The model is solved both analytically, by means of probability generating function techniques,
both numerically through computer simulations. As we are primarily interested in the computa-
tional part of their work, in what follows we will not discuss the analytical solution provided by
the authors.
7Such situation is more likely to occur when the market for financial assets is illiquid (cfr.
Gai-Kapadia 2010, p.3)
8With financial intermediaries we mean banks, insurance companies, hedge funds, pension funds
and in general all the financial institutions that connect agents in surplus and agents in deficit.
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an incoming link for bank i and an outgoing link for bank j. The resulting network
structure is therefore directed and weighted9.
Practically the model is impelmented thorugh the following steps.
Building the Financial Network First the financial network is constructed
passing over all possible directed (non-weighted) links and activating each one with
indepedent proabbility. In other words, one by one all nodes are considered and an
incoming link is created with a proability p. The result is a (Poisson) random graph
Γ (N, p)10 that is mathematically represented by an N ×N matrix, called adjacency
matrix, which main diagonal is made of null elements (since links starting and ending
in the same nodes are not allowed, that is a bank can not have a credit/debt with
itself). In their simulation Gai and Kapadia consider a (Poisson) random graph
composed of 1,000 nodes.
Initializing the Model At time t = 0 the model is initialized filling up the banks’
balance sheets in accordance with the following assumptions:
a) the same amount of interbank assets is assigned to every bank, i.e. Aibi,0 = A
ib
j,0
∀i, j. In addition, interbank assets are assumed to be evenly distributed among
all active links, therefore the credit owed from bank j to bank i is equal to the
amount of interbank assets of bank i divided by the number of incoming link
of bank i ;
b) from the previous assumption derives that interbank liabilities are endoge-
nously determinated since each interbank assets Aibi,j corresponds to an inter-
bank liability Libj,i for another bank;
c) total assets are assumed to be constituted for the 20% of interbank asstes and
for the 80% of non-interbank assets11, therefore we can write:
Atoti,t = A
ib
i,t + A
m
i,t
9See Appendix A for a definition of directed and weighted network
10See Appendix A for a definition of (Poisson) random graph.
11As recalled by Gai and Kapadia, this division of the asset side in interbank and non-interbank
assets is consistent with the figures reported in Upper(2007)
17
Aibi,0 = 0.2 · Atoti,0
Ami,0 = 0.8 · Atoti,0
Ami,0 = 4 · Aibi,0 (2.1)
d) the capital buffer Ki,0 of a generic bank is set to be the 4% of its total assets,
therefore manipulating the previously established relations we can write
Ki,0 =
Aibi,0
5
(2.2)
It worth noting that, given these assumptions, at time t = 0 all banks are
perfectly homogeneous with respect to their total assets and capital buffer
and that it is possible to express all these variables in terms of interbank
assets;
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e) finally the liability side of the balace sheet is topped-up with deposits in order
to respect the accounting identities, that is:
Di,0 = A
tot
i,0 − Libi,0 −Ki,0 (2.3)
Note that Di,0 will not change during the dynamics of the model, i.e. it is
equal to its initial value ∀t.
The mechanism of contagion The dynamics of the model proceeds quite me-
chanically in the following way. All banks are initially solvent, then at time t = 1
the network is perturbed by the default 12 of a single bank selected randomly. In
practice the default is generated by wiping out all the external asstes of the bank,
that is setting Ami = 0. This is sufficient to ensure that the bank will fail because:
Aibi,0 + 0− Libi,0 −Di,0 ≤ 0
Aibi,0 − Libi,0 − (
24
5
Aibi,0 − Libi,0) ≤ 0
−19
5
Aibi,0 ≤ 0
which is true ∀Aibi,0 ≥ 0.
This initial shock can be absorbed or amplified and in principle can trigger a cascade
of defaults. A zero recovery assumption is made, that is the failed bank is assumed to
default of all its interbank liabilites, thus causing a complete loss to creditor banks
which mark down to zero the value of their claim13. If losses exceed the capital
buffer of the bank, then it is set into default too and another round of markdowns
begins, otherwise capital is simply reduced in order to absorb the loss. This iterative
process keeps going until no further bank defaults.
From the balance sheet defined above, it is possible to derive the condition for
12This intial default can be see as an idiosyncratic shock or as the result of an aggregate shock
that has had particularly negative effects on a single bank.
13In some of the numerical simulations performed by the authors show that their results are ro-
bust to relaxing this assumption. However, as we will see later in this work, the weaker assumption
that is made is quite questionable.
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solvency of a generic bank i ∀t, which is
(1− φ)Aibi,t + qAmi,t − Libi,t −Di,t > 0 (2.4)
where φ is the fraction of banks that were in debt with bank i that have defaulted
and q is the reseal price of illiquid assets, namely all the assets that belong to Am,
such as mortgages or other types of long term lendings. The value of φ is ∈ [0, 1],
the higher is its value the more the bank will lose; in the extreme case of φ = 1 all
debtors of bank i have defaluted and therefore the bank will not receive back any of
the money lended to other banks. Also the value of q ∈ [0, 1], when q = 1 we have
no ”fire sales”14, while for q < 1 we have fire sales which imply that the total assets
of the bank decrease. Note that q captures the liquidity effects associated with the
potential detrimental effects of the default cascade on assets prices: in other words
the sequence of default that can be triggered by an intial shock may negatively affect
the value of Afi therefore providing another, indirect, source of contagion. We can
rewrite the solvency condition as follows:
φ <
Aibi + qA
m
i − Libi −Di
Aibi
(2.5)
moreover, given that the capital buffer is Ki = A
ib
i +A
m
i − Libi −Di, by adding and
subtracting Ami we get:
φ <
Ki − (1− q)Ami
Aibi
, Aibi 6= 0 (2.6)
Because of the assumption that total interbank asstes are evenly distibuted across
all incoming links, when a single counterpart defaults, the fraction φ of banks that
were in debt with bank i that have defaulted is equal to 1/ji, where ji is the number
of incoming links of bank i.
The default condition after the intial shock is then:
14With the term ”fire sales” it is generally intended the sale of goods at very discounted prices.
Firse sales typically occur when the seller faces bankruptcy and is forced to sell at low price to
avoid bankrupt or to cover all or part of its debt. Historically the origin of the term is due to the
sale of goods at a heavy discount due to fire damage.
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1ji
>
Ki − (1− q)Ami
Aibi
(2.7)
which express the vulnerability condition and hence the condition for the spread of
default. The latter expression is used by Gai and Kapadia to provide an analytical
solution to the model.
The main finding of the two economists of the Bank of England is that “financial
systems exhibit a robust-yet-fragile tendency: while the probability of contagion
may be low, the effects can be extremely widespread when problems occur”.
Graphically, this result can be seen in this figure: Indeed we observe that for high
Figure 2.1: Gai Kapadia benchmark model, Chart. 3
degrees of connectivity the frequancy of contagion is very low, but the extent is
complete in the system.
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Chapter 3
The model
As it has been seen in the previous chapter, almost all the literature on contagion
in financial networks has focused its attention primarily on how idiosyncratic ex-
ogenous shocks represented by the sudden failure of a bank can affect the financial
system.
Due to its nature, the type of shock typically assumed by the majority of the models
of this kind, mimics the effects of a fraud event or of a macroeconomic shock with
particularly adverse consequences for one institution (see Gai-Kapadia (2010)). Al-
though purely idiosyncratic shocks have happened in the past and have led to the
failure of some financial institutions (for example Barings Bank, the oldest merchant
bank of London, in 1995), they are rare events and not the norm. Therefore, es-
pecially form a policy point of view, it would be appropriate to test the resilience
of the financial system also on more frequent events, like economic downturns and
declines in demand.
Our analysis aims to take a step in this direction, trying to provide a more solid
microfoundation for the initial shock. In our model the initial shock is not produced
by the default of a bank, but by the default of a certain number of firms, which
follows from a fall in aggregate demand that put them out of business and makes
them unable to pay back their loans. In other words the we induce an initial real
shock at firms level and then we let it propagate to the financial system, with con-
sequences that depend of the features of such a system. It is worth noting that in
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this way, since more banks can have loans to the same firm and that more firms can
have loans with the same bank, we do not have a single “big shock”, but a plurality
of “small” shocks hitting different parts of the financial system.
Starting from the work of Gai and Kapadia (Gai & Kapadia, 2010), we developed
a model able to asses the probability and the extent of contagion when the initial
shock is the one described above.
By contagion we mean the mechanism through which “a shock that initially affects
only a particular region or sector or perhaps even a few institutions can become sys-
temic and then infect the larger economy” (Allen et al. , 2009).
To preserve the possibility of a comparison with the result provided in Gai and Ka-
padia (2010), we manteined, when possible, the same assumptions, for example we
will use the same network structure (i.e. a random network) and the same definition
of probability of contagion (i.e. the likelihood of defaults hitting at least 5% of the
system). However, in order to overcome some of the limits of the original model,
we departed from it in several crucial respects, from the already mentioned type of
intial shock, to other aspects that will be described in the next section. As final
remark it must be said that, for the way in which they are modelled, the nodes rep-
resenting firms could also be thought of as representing households, since in reality
also households can borrow from banks15.
3.1 The logic of the model
The model that we are going to present takes as key starting point the work of Gai
& Kapadia (2010) described in the previous chapters. It draws also from Nier et
al.(2007) in the kind of analysis developed and from Montagna and Lux (2013) in
the study of the dynamics of contagion.
15Indeed the link with the banks is the same both for firms and households. However we didn’t
introduce hoseholds in that way because it would have added little to the analysis. A more
significant modelization of hoseholds, which could justify their explicit presence in the model,
would require the presence of interactions not only between hoseholds and banks, but also with
firms. This would have required the modellization of hoseholds behaviour, which goes beyond the
scope of this work and it is left for future studies.
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The main contact points with Gai & Kapadia (2010) are the network structure
adopted and the way in which shocks are transmitted, since losses are allowed to be
either absorbed or amplified along the default cascade. In this sense we differ from
the mechanism proposed by Nier et al. (2007), according to which shocks gradually
fade away.
As mentioned in earlier section and differently from Gai & Kapadia (2010) and
almost all the literature on the topic, with some similarities only with Anand et al.
(2013), we intorduce a second type of nodes in the network which represent firms,
with the aim of providing a first and very elementary conjunction point between
the financial side and the real side of the economy. In addition, while Gai and
Kapdia assume perfectly homogeneous banks in terms of size and initial balance
sheet composition, which only differ in the number of incoming and outgoing links
16, we assume heterogeneous banks and we draw for each of them the intial value of
total asset from an uniform distibution within a range, from which we then calculate
the balance sheet. In doing this we do not change the logic behind the construction of
the balance sheet since, as in the Gai and Kapadia model, we “derive” the liability
side of the balance sheet from the value of the total assets, in accordance with
the idea, recently proposed in a famous bullettin of the Bank of England, that
lending creates deposits and not the other way around 17. However, at least for
what concerns the model presented in the next sections, a logic of construction that
go in a reverse order (i.e. from the deposits to the assets) would not change the
results and the choice is just a matter of which economic theory is considered more
correct.
3.1.1 Assumptions
We consider an interbank market populated by n financial entities - banks for short
- and m firms. The n banks are linked together by their claims on each other and
16As we will see in the numerical simulations this assumption on homogeneity has important
implication on the frequency and spread of the contagion
17It shall not be a coincidence that Gai and Kapadia are two economists of the Bank of England
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are also linked to the m firms by the loans given. Firms are assumed not to lend to
banks nor to each other. We have, therefore, a network constituted by two types of
nodes: banks, which we will call type-1 nodes, and firms, which we will call type-2
node. The interbank assets and liabilities are respectively represented as incoming
and outgoing type-1 links (we can think of an asset as an arrow pointing-in a node
and of a liability as an arrow pointing-out) which are directed and weighted by the
amount of the asset/liability. The liabilities of firms toward banks are represented
as type-2 links directed only from firms to banks and weighted by the amount of the
liability.
Following (Nier et al. , 2007), we use the scheme in Figure 3.1 in order to represent
the balance sheets of a generic bank.
Figure 3.1: Balance sheet structure
The assets Ai of each bank (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) are partitioned into interbank loans li
and external assets ei:
Ai = li + ei (3.1)
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The liabilities Li of each bank are partitioned into internal borrowing bi, customersaˆ
deposits di, and net worth (or equity) ηi:
Li = bi + di + ηi (3.2)
External assets ei are assumed to be a constant fraction (the same for all banks) of
total assets:
ei = θAi (3.3)
Consequently interbank loans li will be:
li = (1− θ)Ai (3.4)
The net worth (or equity) ηi is assumed to a be a constant fraction (again the same
for all banks) of total (non risk-weighted) assets:
ηi = γAi (3.5)
In order to be solvent, banks’ difference between total assets and total liabilities
must be positive, that is:
ηi ≡ li + ei − bi − di > 0 (3.6)
If the solvency condition is not respected, bank i becomes insolvent and set into
default18: defaulted banks are assumed to default on all their liabilities (i.e. par
condicio creditorum is assumed) and for all the amount (i.e. no partial recovery of
the asset is assumed19 20), so the corresponding asset of creditor banks are set equal
18As pointed out both from Montagna and Lux and from Gai and Kapadia it would be possible
to impose a minimal capital requirement, but that “would leave our results qualitatively unchanged
as it would just lead to a linear rescaling of the balance sheet” (Montagna & Lux, 2013) p.5
19It would be possible to relax this assumption and allow for a partial recovery, namely that
when a linked bank defaults, the creditor bank does not lose all of its asset held against that bank,
but get some fraction of it, for example a share of the remaining assets of the defaulted bank
proportional to the weight of creditor’s asset over all other liabilities of the defaulted bank.
20As pointed out by Gai and Kapadia this assumption is likely to be realistic in the middle
of a crisis: in the immediate aftermath of a default, the recovery rate and the timing of recovery
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to zero and their balance sheets are accordingly reduced by the amount loss.
3.1.2 The algorithm: 1) initializing the model
For each computer simulation we perform the following steps in sequence.
As a first step we draw at random the level of total assets form an uniform disti-
bution in a range [Amin, Amax]. We then construct the balance sheet of banks using
equations (4.1), (4.3) - (4.5).
Subsequently, we generate the inter-bank network represented by a (Poisson) random
graph in which each possible directed link is present with independent probability p;
in the same way we construct the firms-banks network. Hence we have two random
graph Γ1 (n, p1 ) and Γ2 (n,m, p2 ), which can be represented mathematically by two
adjacency matrices, an nxn and an nxm matrix. The elements of the matrices are,
for the moment, only 0 or 1: a 0 means absence of link; a 1 in the element i, j
signals the presence of a link which goes from node j to node i, so it is an incoming
link for node i and an outgoing link for node j. The main diagonal of Γ1 (n, p1 )
has only zeros beacuse self-loops, i.e. links starting and ending in the same node,
are not allowed (in other words a bank cannot have a credit or debit with itself);
instead, consistently with bankruptcy law, we do not net interbank positions, so two
banks can be linked with each other in both directions. Γ2 (n,m, p2 ) is a rectangular
matrix so it hasn’t a main diagonal, however no restrictions on the presence of 1 are
imposed.
The algorithm then calculates the number of incoming type-1 links for each node
and computes the value of each single interbank asset by dividing the total interbank
assets of bank i by its number of incoming links. Therefore all the interbank assets
owned by a bank are of the same amount. In the same way we calculate the number
of incoming type-2 links for each bank and the value of each single external asset.
will be highly uncertain and banksaˆ funders are likely to assume the worst-case scenario.(Gai &
Kapadia, 2010). This is what actually happened in the case of Lehman Brothers, where the partial
refunds are still not completed after six years. Intuitively, relaxing this assumption will reduce the
frequency of contagion and the extent of contagion, but a more carefull study of the effects of a
positive rate of recovery are left for future work.
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Hence we have that the total interbank asset position and the total external asset
position of every bank is evenly distributed over each of its incoming links.
Once found the amount of the average interbank and external asset for each bank,
we substitute it, row by row, in the respective adiacency matrices in place of 1,
obtaining two matrices weighted for the amount of the assets.
Thus summing along the second dimension of the banks-banks adjacency matrix
(i.e. making the column sum), we obtain for each bank the total amount on its in-
terbank assets li. In the same way we obtain the total amount on its external assets
ei from the banks-firms adiacency matrix. Moreover, since every interbank asset
is another bankaˆs liability, interbank liabilities are endogenously determined in the
system, therefore summing along the first dimension of the banks-banks adjacency
matrix (i.e. making the row sum), we obtain for each bank the total amount on its
interbank liabilities bi.
We further assume that banks with no type-1 incoming links but with type-2 incom-
ing links have li = 0 and Ai = ei; banks with type-1 incoming links and no type-2
incoming links have ei = 0 and Ai = li; banks with no type-1 incoming links and no
type-2 incoming links have li = 0, ei = 0 and Ai = 0 (i.e. the bank is removed from
the network).
Finally, exploiting relation (4.2) and (4.6) we fill the liability side of the balance
sheet, which is “topped-up” by deposits.
3.1.3 The algorithm: 2) shock trasmission
After the initial shock, banks linked with defaulted firms occur in a loss. If the
loss of one or more banks is big enough to overcome its net worth and to make it
unable to respect the solvency condition (4.6), then the bank is setted into default
and creditors mark down to zero the value of their claim. If the resulting loss
for creditors exceeds their net worth, then also creditors are setted into defaults
and another round of marksdowns begins. Otherwise if the net worth is sufficient
to cushion the loss occurred, net woth is reduced by the amount of the loss, the
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bank hitted keeps surviving and the shock is not transimtted to other banks. This
mechanism is repeated until no further default occurs.
Therefore the initial shock is allowed both to be absorbed both to be amplified by
the system through a series of default cascades which may end up in a systemic
crisis.
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Chapter 4
Simulations results
To illustrate the results of the model described in the previous chapter, we calibrate
it with empirically observed values of the parameters21 and simulate it numerically
in MatLab through Monte Carlo technique. We run 100000 simulation for the bench-
mark case and 10000 simulations when we compare the effects of different values
of the parameters, because of computational time constraints. Clearly the higher
the number of simulations the better are the results: we observed that for 100000
repetitions the results are very good, with 10000 they are more “noisy”, but still
good enough to detect the trend of the system.
In each simulation we generate a (Poisson) random graph22, where each node of the
network represents a bank and each possible directed link is present with indepen-
dent probability p.
Our algorithm explicitly avoid the possibility of self-loops in the generation of type-1
network (i.e. of links strating and ending in the same node) because it would make
no sense to have banks with links (i.e credits and/or debits) with itself; to do so
we substitute the ones that may be present on the main diagonal of the randomly
generated adjacency matrix with zeros. This implies an ex post change of the out-
21When empirically observed values are not available we usually test a wide range of values;
in the case neither empirical values are used nor wide ranges are explored we will point it out
explicitly, explaining the reason why we decide to choose that particular value of a parameter.
22As in Gai and Kapadia, the random graph has been chosen for simplicity and conducting the
simulation analysis under different degree distributions would be a useful extension which we left
for future work.
30
come of the distibution used to generate the network and a difference between the
theoretical and actual degree of connectivity. This operation may appear not per-
fectly correct from a theoretical point of view, but given the high number of nodes
this “bias” is very small and therefore neglegible23. Moreover in a random network
structure, where each node is likely to have other links (in our particular case also
many other links) and where each node has on average the same number of links,
this change is definitely insignificant. It would have been different, for example, in a
scale-free network with preferential attachment, where typically there are few nodes
with many links and many nodes with few links, so even though it is an unlikely
event, to wipe out a link from a node which has few links can have some effect on
the overall network structure and so on the aggregate dynamics of the system.
Before proceeding to illustrate the results of the computer simulations, one point de-
serves to be highlighted since recurs in all subsequent figures. Indeed, following the
definition provided by Gai and Kapadia (2010), the “extent of contagion measures
the fraction of banks which default, conditional on contagion over the 5% threshold
breaking out” (Gai & Kapadia (2010) p.21). This means that the extent of contagion
shown in the plots is the arithmetic average not of all the values of the extent of
contagion occurred in each repetition, but only of the values greater than 5%. This
has important implications because, in principle, it is possible that on 1000 repeti-
tions the extent of contagion is lower than 5% for 999 times and equal to 100% for 1
time. According to the above definition the extent of contagion would therefore be
equal to 100%, but trust this measure would be an error because it is flawed by an
insufficient statistic: indeed, depending on the specific values of the parameters, for
some degrees of connectivity we do not have a sufficiently high level of observations
to compute a significative average and we have to compute an average over very few
observations.
There are at least two possible solutions to this issue. One is to perform dynamic
23Anyway it would be possible to correct such a distortion by recomputing the actual probabiliy
of the network and using the actual value instead of the theoretical one for calculating the average
degree. When the difference between the actual and the theoretical value is small as in our case it
is not worth to do that.
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simulations, namely to run the simulations until it is reached a significant level of
observations for all degrees of connectivity. This option is surely the best solution
from a theorical point of view, but it is extremely costly in computational terms.
Another solution, which is the one adopted here, is to increase the number of simu-
lations to an order of magnitude sufficiently high to get enough observations. This
solution is less sound than the previous from a theorical point of view and has the
drawback that does not guarantee a priori the desired result, but it is surely more
affordable in computational terms.
With this explanation in mind, the reader knows that the “noisy” fluctuations that
may appear in some of the following figures have to be related to this issue, espe-
cially in the cases in which the number of simulations is 10000.
In what follows we will focus our attention in analyzing both the final outcome of
our simulation in terms of frequancy and extent of contagion, both the dynamics of
the system, with particluar attention to the number of rounds (or default cascades)
occured, to the number of defaults per round and to the loss of wealth - total and
for each round - at aggregate level. We will show that, although the model relies
on stylised assumptions, it is able to capture the role of diversification on finan-
cial stability and the distinction between risk sharing and risk spreading within the
financial network.
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4.1 The benchmark case
In the financial system, our principal segment of investigation is the one composed
by large banks and large firms since, as a matter of fact, they are more involved
in risky business, manage bigger volumes of money and are therefore more relevant
in terms of potential risk for the whole system. Accordingly, we consider as a
benchmark a network of 100 banks and 500 firms: these values, however arbitrary,
can be considered reasonable in the light of our previous assumption and of the fact
that the number of financial intermediaries in a system depends on how the system
is defined and what counts as a financial intermediary ((Gai & Kapadia, 2010) p.20).
Clearly a more accurate comparison with empirical data would be desirable, but it
would add little to the overall analysis if data on bilateral exposures between banks
and between banks and firms are not (publicly) available.
For the benchmark case the internal structure of the nodes (i.e. the balance sheets
of the banks) is parametrised adopting the following values: η = 0.04, = 0.2, pF =
0.0002, δ = 0.1. This values have been choosen in order to preserve as much as
possible comparability with the work of Gai and Kapadia (2010); moreover, as
reported in (Upper, 2007) the value of θ is braodly consistent with the share of
interbank assets owed by banks in developed countries, while the value of η is close
to the one measured in the british market. Finally the value of the mortality rate
of firms δ has been setted equal to the rate registered for the EU in 2010; this value
is also broadly consistent with the one registered in Italy in 2007 by ISTAT which
was equal to 7,5%. Therefore it appears to be a good approximation of reality and
a good benchmark point24.
24Note that an higher mortality rate would simply widen the frequency and the probabilty of
contagion since it amplifies the intial shock.
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4.1.1 Extent and frequency of contagion
Figure 4.1 shows the extent and the frequency of contagion as a function of the
avergage degree computed over T = 100000 repetitions, with θ = 0.2, η = 0.04,
pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1.
Figure 4.1: Extent and frequency of contagion as a function of the avergage degree.
In all the 100000 repetitions the other paramenters are fixed at: θ = 0.2, η =
0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
We see that the probability of contagion is non-monotonic in connectivity : it ini-
tially increases, peaking above 0.4 when the average degree is between 3 and 5
and then declining toward zero. The extent of contagion is initially increasing very
rapidly, reaching its maximum for values of the average degree between 4.4 and 6;
then it starts to slowly decreases, but manteining values above 0.9 for a wide range
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of average degrees, in particular from values between 3 and almost 1025.
The contagion window, that is the range of average degree for which there is conta-
gion above 5% threshold, goes from an average degree of connectivity of 0 to more
than 18. The amplitude of the contagion window depends on the heterogeneity be-
tween banks’ size: it would have been smaller if we had homogeneous banks (Iori
et al. , 2006).
Finally it is possible to note that while high connectivity may reduce the probability
of contagion, it can also increase its spread when problems occur, especilly for some
ranges of the average degree: in other words crises happens less frequently, but are
more severe. We do not find an asymptotic limit (or plateaux) for the extent of con-
tagion curve, which shows a maximum for an average degree of 6 and then slowly
decreases. This is due to the type of initial shock that we adopted, that is many
small shocks at firms level rather that a unique shock at banks level, which is more
likely to be absorbed by single banks.
Although the model is very simple and rather mechanical in its working, it is able
to capture different features of modern financial systems: the benefits of diversifi-
cation deriving from risk sharing (i.e increasing in connectivity) allows to reduce
individual risk, but over a certain degree of connectivity they do so at the expenses
of the systemic one, because of the risk spreading within the financial network. As
a result, idiosyncratic risk is ultimately aggregated and transformed into systemic
risk, so that contagion is possible even when diversification of risk in the system is
maximised (Gai & Kapadia, 2010).
25As it has been already stressed, the erratic movements in the extent of contagion for average
degrees above 14 are due to insufficient observations.
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4.1.2 Dynamic of the model
We now analyze the dynamics of the model considering separately all the results of
the simulations and then only the ones in which it has been observed a systemic
crisis.
The computer algorithm implemented is albe to track the dynamics of the contagion
process trhough the different rounds. In the following two figures we observe the
average number of rounds computed on all the simulations performed and average
number of rounds computed conditional on contagion.
Figure 4.2: In the top diagram: average number of rounds computed on all the
simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds computed
conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, pF =
0.0002, δ = 0.1
As we might have expected, the average number of rounds peaks in correspondece
of that values of the average degree in which the frequency of contagion is higher.
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Figure 4.3: In the top diagram: average number of rounds computed on all the
simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds com-
puted conditional on contagion. In both diagrams vertical bars represent standard
deviations. The results are obtained for θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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The same obviously holds for the average total number of defaults.
Figure 4.4: In the top diagram: total number of defaults computed as an average of
all the simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds
computed conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for θ = 0.2, η =
0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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Particularly interesting is how defaults are distributed across different rounds. In-
deed, quite surprisingly, when we compute the defaults per rounds we observe an
increase in the number of defaults up to round number 7 and then a decrease.
This testifies an increasing gravity of the crisis with time, which is the result of a
domino effect.
Figure 4.5: The bar plots shows the absolute number of defaults for the first six
rounds computed as an average of all the simulations performed. The results are
obtained for θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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Figure 4.6: The bar plots shows the absolute number of defaults for the second six
rounds computed as an average of all the simulations performed. The results are
obtained for θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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Figure 4.7: The bar plots shows the absolute number of defaults for the first six
rounds computed as an average conditional on contagion > 5%. The results are
obtained for θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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Figure 4.8: The bar plots shows the absolute number of defaults for the second six
rounds computed as an average conditional on contagion. The results are obtained
for θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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The folowing graph shows the aggregate loss in terms of interbank assets as a share
on the intial aggregate interbank wealth. Each line corresponds to a different default
cascade (i.e. round of defaults) and the area below each line represents the loss
occurred during that cascade. We can see that while initial rounds imply a limited
aggregate loss, central rounds, namely the ones from the third to the eighth, are
those in which the reduction of interbank assets is more severe. This is consistent
with the fact that the majority of defaults occur in the middle rounds of cascade as
a result of a domino effetc.
Figure 4.9: For each value of the average degree, the graph shows the aggregate
loss in terms of interbank assets as a share on the intial aggregate interbank wealth.
Each line corresponds to a different default cascade (i.e. round of defaults); the area
below each line represents the loss occurred during that cascade. The results are
obtained for θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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In the following four figures it is shown the aggregate loss disaggregated per round
calculated as an average on all the simulations.
Figure 4.10: For every average degree, the plots show the loss associated to the first
six rounds. The results are obtained for θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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Figure 4.11: For every average degree, the plots show the loss associated to the
second six rounds. The results are obtained for θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ =
0.1
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In the following four figures it is shown the aggregate loss disaggregated per round
calculated as an average conditional on contagion.
Figure 4.12: For every average degree, the plots show the loss associated to the
first six rounds conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for θ = 0.2, η =
0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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Figure 4.13: For every average degree, the plots show the loss associated to the
second six rounds conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for θ = 0.2, η =
0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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4.2 Varying η
In the following section we run the model for T = 100000 repetitions for different
values of η keeping fixed the others parameters at the values used in the benchmark
case, namely θ = 0.2, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1.
This exercise allows us to study which are the possible effects of an higher level of
net worth.
4.2.1 Extent and frequency of contagion
Testing our model for variuos values of η it turns out that increasing the value of
the equity reduces the probability and the extent of contagion because banks have
more capital to absorb losses and dampen the shocks.
Indeed, by looking at Figure 14, we see that the probability of contagion switch from
about 30% in the case of η = 0.03 to 10% in the case of η = 0.08.
Also the spread of contagion is enormously reduced and passes from 1 at η = 0.03,
to 0.4 at η = 0.03. Indeed the y-axis of the subplot (d), (e) and (f) do not reach 1,
in other words even if at a first look they may seem not too much different form, for
example, subplot (a), indeed they are.
Therefore the increasing in η has the general effect of reducing both the risk of a
systemic crise, both its extent, for every level of average degree.
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(a) η = 0.02 (b) η = 0.03
(c) η = 0.04 (d) η = 0.05
(e) η = 0.06 (f) η = 0.07
Figure 4.14: Extent and frequency of contagion as a function of the avergage degree.
The results are obtained for different values of η, given the values of the other
parameters fixed at θ = 0.2, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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4.2.2 Dynamic of the model
As for the benchamrk case we now analyze the dynamics of the model considering
separately all the results of the simulations and then only the ones in which it has
been observed a systemic crisis.
As η increases the average number of rounds decreases both when computed on all
the simulations’ result both when only conditional on contagion.
(a) η = 0.02 (b) η = 0.03
(c) η = 0.04 (d) η = 0.05
(e) η = 0.06 (f) η = 0.07
Figure 4.15: In the top diagram: average number of rounds computed on all the
simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds computed
conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for different values of η, given
the values of the other parameters fixed at θ = 0.2, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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(a) η = 0.02 (b) η = 0.03
(c) η = 0.04 (d) η = 0.05
(e) η = 0.06 (f) η = 0.07
Figure 4.16: In the top diagram: total number of defaults computed as an average
on all the simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds
computed conditional on contagion. In both diagrams vertical bars represent stan-
dard deviations. The results are obtained for different values of η, given the values
of the other parameters fixed at θ = 0.2, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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(a) η = 0.02 (b) η = 0.03
(c) η = 0.04 (d) η = 0.05
(e) η = 0.06 (f) η = 0.07
Figure 4.17: In the top diagram: total number of defaults computed as an average
of all the simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds
computed conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for different values of
η, given the values of the other parameters fixed at θ = 0.2, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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The folowing graph shows the aggregate loss in terms of interbank assets as a share
on the intial aggregate interbank wealth. Each line corresponds to a different default
cascade (i.e. round of defaults) and the area below each line represents the loss
occurred during that cascade. It is immediatly clear how an increase in η decreases
dramatically the average loss of the system, from a level of 30% with η = 0.02 to less
the 5% with η = 0.07. So an increase in η has a positive effect of the stability of the
system which is more than proportional. This is due to a positive domino effetc (or
virtuos circle) which doesn’t allows losses to spread and cause other losses, reducing
(as it has been seen in the previous figures) the average number of defaults, but not
the number of rounds. Therefore an intial increase in η, even though may be costly
for banks, has potential benefits which far exceeds their cost.
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(a) η = 0.02 (b) η = 0.03
(c) η = 0.04 (d) η = 0.05
(e) η = 0.06 (f) η = 0.07
Figure 4.18: For each value of the average degree, the graph shows the aggregate
loss in terms of interbank assets as a share on the intial aggregate interbank wealth.
Each line corresponds to a different default cascade (i.e. round of defaults); the area
below each line represents the loss occurred during that cascade. The results are
obtained for different values of η, given the values of the other parameters fixed at
θ = 0.2, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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4.3 Varying θ
In the following section we run the model for T = 100000 repetitions for different
values of θ keeping fixed the others parameters at the values used in the benchmark
case, namely η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1.
This exercise allows us to study which are the possible effects of an higher share of
external assets in banks’ balance sheets on the whole system.
4.3.1 Extent and frequency of contagion
Testing our model for variuos values of θ it turns out that increasing its level increases
enormously the probability and the extent of contagion, also for high degrees of
connectivity.
This is due to the fact that higher θ means higher average loans to firms for each
bank and therefore also higher losses when a firm default, while η doesn’t increase
proportionally because it is a fraction ot total assets of every bank and not of external
assets.
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(a) θ = 0.1 (b) θ = 0.2
(c) θ = 0.3 (d) θ = 0.4
(e) θ = 0.5 (f) θ = 0.6
Figure 4.19: Extent and frequency of contagion as a function of the avergage degree.
The results are obtained for different values of θ, given the values of the other
parameters fixed at η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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4.3.2 Dynamic of the model
As for the benchamrk case we analyze the dynamics of the model considering sepa-
rately all the results of the simulations and then only the ones in which it has been
observed a systemic crisis.
As θ increases the average number of rounds is almost unchanged both when com-
puted on all the simulations’ result both when only conditional on contagion.
(a) θ = 0.01 (b) θ = 0.02
(c) θ = 0.03 (d) θ = 0.04
(e) θ = 0.05 (f) θ = 0.06
Figure 4.20: In the top diagram: average number of rounds computed on all the
simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds computed
conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for different values of θ, given
the values of the other parameters fixed at η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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(a) θ = 0.01 (b) θ = 0.02
(c) θ = 0.03 (d) θ = 0.04
(e) θ = 0.05 (f) θ = 0.06
Figure 4.21: In the top diagram: total number of defaults computed as an average
on all the simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds
computed conditional on contagion. In both diagrams vertical bars represent stan-
dard deviations. The results are obtained for different values of θ, given the values
of the other parameters fixed at η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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(a) θ = 0.01 (b) θ = 0.02
(c) θ = 0.03 (d) θ = 0.04
(e) θ = 0.05 (f) θ = 0.06
Figure 4.22: In the top diagram: total number of defaults computed as an average
of all the simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds
computed conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for different values of
θ, given the values of the other parameters fixed at η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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The figure in the next page shows the aggregate loss in terms of interbank assets as a
share on the intial aggregate interbank wealth. Each line corresponds to a different
default cascade (i.e. round of defaults) and the area below each line represents the
loss occurred during that cascade.
It is immediatly clear how an increase in θ increases dramatically the average loss
of the system, from a level of less than 5% with θ = 0.01 to a level of more than
30% with θ = 0.06.
An increase in θ (given the value of η) has therefore detrimental effect on the stability
of the system because, given the assumptions of our model, by increasing the average
size of firms present, it ultimately increases the value of the intial loss at aggregate
level.
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(a) θ = 0.01 (b) θ = 0.02
(c) θ = 0.03 (d) θ = 0.04
(e) θ = 0.05 (f) θ = 0.06
Figure 4.23: For each value of the average degree, the graph shows the aggregate
loss in terms of interbank assets as a share on the intial aggregate interbank wealth.
Each line corresponds to a different default cascade (i.e. round of defaults); the area
below each line represents the loss occurred during that cascade. The results are
obtained for different values of θ, given the values of the other parameters fixed at
η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
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4.4 Varying pF
In the following section we run the model for T = 100000 repetitions for different
values of pF keeping fixed the others parameters at the values used in the benchmark
case, namely η = 0.04, θ = 0.2, δ = 0.1.
This exercise allows us to study which are the possible effects of an higher connec-
tivity between banks and firms, namely of more lending activity directed to firms,
on the whole system.
4.4.1 Extent and frequency of contagion
Testing our model for variuos values of pF it turns out that increasing its level
increases the probability of contagion, but not its extent (fluctuation of the blue
curve for high degrees of connectivity for pF = 0.0001 and pF = 0.0002 are again
due to insufficient observations).
This is due to the fact that more banks can be linked with the same firm and the
failure of a firm can put in troubles more banks simultaneously, so increasing the
probability of a crisis.
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(a) pF = 0.0001 (b) pF = 0.0002
(c) pF = 0.0003 (d) pF = 0.0004
Figure 4.24: Extent and frequency of contagion as a function of the avergage degree.
The results are obtained for different values of pF , given the values of the other
parameters fixed at θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, δ = 0.1
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4.4.2 Dynamic of the model
As for the benchamrk case we analyze the dynamics of the model considering sepa-
rately all the results of the simulations and then only the ones in which it has been
observed a systemic crisis.
As pF increases the average number of rounds is almost unchanged both when com-
puted on all the simulations’ result both when only conditional on contagion.
(a) pF = 0.0001 (b) pF = 0.0002
(c) pF = 0.0003 (d) pF = 0.0004
Figure 4.25: In the top diagram: average number of rounds computed on all the
simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds computed
conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for different values of η, given
the values of the other parameters fixed at θ = 0.2, pF = 0.0002, δ = 0.1
The figure in the next page shows the aggregate loss in terms of interbank assets as a
share on the intial aggregate interbank wealth. Each line corresponds to a different
default cascade (i.e. round of defaults) and the area below each line represents the
loss occurred during that cascade.
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(a) pF = 0.0001 (b) pF = 0.0002
(c) pF = 0.0003 (d) pF = 0.0004
Figure 4.26: In the top diagram: total number of defaults computed as an average
on all the simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds
computed conditional on contagion. In both diagrams vertical bars represent stan-
dard deviations. The results are obtained for different values of pF , given the values
of the other parameters fixed at η = 0.04, θ = 0.2, δ = 0.1
65
(a) pF = 0.0001 (b) pF = 0.0002
(c) pF = 0.0003 (d) pF = 0.0004
Figure 4.27: In the top diagram: total number of defaults computed as an average
of all the simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds
computed conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for different values of
pF , given the values of the other parameters fixed at η = 0.04, θ = 0.2, δ = 0.1
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An increase in pF increases the average loss of the system, especially for low values
of the average degree.
(a) pF = 0.0001 (b) pF = 0.0002
(c) pF = 0.0003 (d) pF = 0.0004
Figure 4.28: For each value of the average degree, the graph shows the aggregate
loss in terms of interbank assets as a share on the intial aggregate interbank wealth.
Each line corresponds to a different default cascade (i.e. round of defaults); the area
below each line represents the loss occurred during that cascade. The results are
obtained for different values of pF , given the values of the other parameters fixed at
η = 0.04, θ = 0.2, δ = 0.1
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4.5 Varying δ
In the following section we run the model for T = 100000 repetitions for different
values of δ keeping fixed the others parameters at the values used in the benchmark
case, namely η = 0.04, θ = 0.2, pF = 0.0002.
This exercise allows us to study which are the possible effects of different magnitude
of initial shocks on the whole system.
4.5.1 Extent and frequency of contagion
(a) δ = 0.05 (b) δ = 0.075
(c) δ = 0.1 (d) δ = 0.125
Figure 4.29: Extent and frequency of contagion as a function of the avergage degree.
The results are obtained for different values of δ, given the values of the other
parameters fixed at θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002
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4.5.2 Dynamic of the model
Testing our model for different values of δ it turns out that increasing the number
of firms initially set into default implies an increas in the probability, but not much
in the extent of contagion.
(a) δ = 0.05 (b) δ = 0.075
(c) δ = 0.1 (d) δ = 0.125
Figure 4.30: In the top diagram: average number of rounds computed on all the
simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds computed
conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for different values of δ, given
the values of the other parameters fixed at θ = 0.2, η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002
The figure in the next page shows the aggregate loss in terms of interbank assets as a
share on the intial aggregate interbank wealth. Each line corresponds to a different
default cascade (i.e. round of defaults) and the area below each line represents the
loss occurred during that cascade.
An increase in δ increases the average loss of the system, especially for low values
of the average degree.
69
(a) δ = 0.05 (b) δ = 0.075
(c) δ = 0.1 (d) δ = 0.125
Figure 4.31: In the top diagram: total number of defaults computed as an average
on all the simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds
computed conditional on contagion. In both diagrams vertical bars represent stan-
dard deviations. The results are obtained for different values of δ, given the values
of the other parameters fixed at η = 0.04, θ = 0.2, pF = 0.0002
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(a) δ = 0.05 (b) δ = 0.075
(c) δ = 0.1 (d) δ = 0.125
Figure 4.32: In the top diagram: total number of defaults computed as an average
of all the simulations performed. In the bottom diagram: average number of rounds
computed conditional on contagion. The results are obtained for different values of
δ, given the values of the other parameters fixed at η = 0.04, pF = 0.0002, θ = 0.2
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(a) δ = 0.05 (b) δ = 0.075
(c) δ = 0.1 (d) δ = 0.125
Figure 4.33: For each value of the average degree, the graph shows the aggregate
loss in terms of interbank assets as a share on the intial aggregate interbank wealth.
Each line corresponds to a different default cascade (i.e. round of defaults); the area
below each line represents the loss occurred during that cascade. The results are
obtained for different values of δ, given the values of the other parameters fixed at
η = 0.04, θ = 0.2, pF = 0.0002
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In the present work we developed a computational model able to assess the prob-
ability and the extent of contagion and to track its dynamical evolution when a
systemic crisis occurs at financial level.
We modelled a simple financial system as a complex random network, in which there
are two types of nodes, banks and firms, and where links between them represent
their reciprocal claims and obligations.
Differently from the growing body of literature on financial networks, bloomed par-
ticulary after the financial crisis started in late 2007, the analysis carried on in these
pages aims to take a step forward in the direction of providing a more solid mi-
crofoundation for those kind of models, in particular for what concerns the initial
shocks that are typically assumed.
In our model the initial shock is not produced by the ex abrupto default of a bank,
but by the default of a certain number of firms. This change intends to mimic a fall
in aggregate demand that put some firms out of business and makes them unable
to pay back their loans. In other words we induce an initial real shock at firms level
that is then allowed to propagate into the financial system. In this way we do not
have a single shock, but a plurality of shocks hitting different parts of the system.
We performed this analysis through Monte Carlo simulations runned in MatLab and
the results obtained have brouth us to the following conclusions.
While high degrees of connectivity may reduce the probability of contagion due to
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risk sharing and diversification, they also increase its spread when crisis occurs; in
other words, diversification revelas to have an ambiguous role of the stability of the
system.
The average degree revealed to be a key paramenter for this kind of model, since
manages to capture both the level of diversification of the system, both its potential
fragility. Indeed, diversification startegies which are good for financial institutions
may result harmful from a systemic point of view because of their role as driver of
contagion.
Therefore we confirm what has been called by the literature robust-yet-fragile ten-
dency of financial sytems (Gai & Kapadia, 2010), which results from the trade off
between positive effects of diversification (robustness due to risk sharing) and nega-
tive effects in case of contagion (fragility due to the fact that risk can quickly spread
through the whole system).
Finally, our simulations revealed that the final outcomes of this type of models are
highly dependent on finer details such as the size of banks, the composition of their
balance sheet, the number and the amount of loans provided from the financial sys-
tem to the real sector and the type of initial shock.
Different microfoundation assumptions have brought us to observe wider contagion
window, as a result of heterogeneity in banks’ size, different extents of contagion,
which must be put in relation with the type of the initial shock, and lower probabil-
ity of contagion, which depend on the number of links existing between banks and
firms. Therefore these models should be investigated more deeply before they can
be used for deriving policy suggestions.
However it is anyway possible to derive at least one clear, althought general, indica-
tion from our results: comparative static and comparative dynamic exercises have
shown with no doubts that to prevent a systemic crises a necessary requirement is
an high level of banks’ capitalization. Indedd for high level of net worht we observed
that the banking system is more able to absorb losses, and this redeces significanlty
the probability, as well as the extent, of crises. In this view, the work that it is
currently being done at international level for Basel III is encouraging since one of
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the main measures will require for higher level of net worth from banks.
The present work provides a first attempt towards the modellization of contagion
risk in financial systems and of the interplay between the financial and the real side
of the economy. It would be useful to extend the simulation analysis by relaxing
the assumption that defaulting firms are randomly selected and consider the impli-
cations of different network structures and links distirbutions between banks and
between firms and banks. To add more realism to the results, a better calibration
of model’s parameters would be necessary, possibly including the composition of
banks’ balance sheet, however this is limited by the lack of data, which, although
often available, are not public. Extending the model in these directions is for sure
desirable and is left for future work.
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A - Network theory
An overview In the broadest sense, “a network is [...] a collection of points joined
together in pairs by lines” (Newman, 2010). In the jargon of network theory points
are called vertices or nodes, while lines are referred to as edges or links. Networks
Figure 5.1: A small network composed of 8 vertices and 10 edges
are about direct interactions and systems which can be represented as networks
(also called “graphs” in much of the mathematical literature) are widespread in the
world: Internet, the World Wide Web, citation networks, social networks, networks
of business relations between companies, power grids, neural networks, metabolic
networks, food webs, etc.
In the last decades many fields of research saw the application of network tech-
niques, but it is just in the very recent years that networks have been applied to the
analysis of financial and economic issues, in particlularly after the financial crisis of
2008 (indeed interactions are an often neglected issue in economics: from general
equilibrium to game theory).
The origin of the study of networks, in the form of mathematical graph theory, is
generally traced back to the Euler’s 1735 solution of the Ko¨nigsberg bridge problem,
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which is often cited as the first true proof in the theory of networks (Newman, 2003).
A very short glossary
• Vertex: the fundamental unit of a network, also called node
• Link: the line connecting two vertices, also called a edge
• Directed/undirected: a link is directed if it runs in only one direction and
undirected if it runs in both directions.
• Directed/Undirected graph: a graph in which all edges are directed/undirected
• Degree: the number of edges connected to a vertex. A directed graph has
both an in-degree and an out-degree for each vertex, which are the numbers
of incoming and outgoing edges respectively.
• Component: the component to which a vertex belongs is that set of vertices
that can be reached from it by paths running along edges of the graph. In
a directed graph a vertex has both an in-component and an out-component,
which are the sets of vertices from which the vertex can be reached and which
can be reached from it.
• Geodesic path: a geodesic path is the shortest path through the network from
one vertex to another. Note that there may be and often is more than one
geodesic path between two vertices.
• Diameter: the diameter of a network is the length (in number of edges) of the
longest geodesic path between any two vertices. A few authors have also used
this term to mean the average geodesic distance in a graph, although strictly
the two quantities are quite distinct.
Basic concepts Mathematically a network is a graph, that is a set Γ = (V ;E),
where V is the set of vertices (nodes), while E is the set of edges (ordered or
unordered).
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Networks can be represented in two ways: with a list of nodes and edges (useful
when V is large and E < V , i.e. the graph is sparse) or with an adjacency matrix
(useful when V is small).
An adjaceny matrix is a NxN matrix A, where A is the number of nodes and where
the generic element of the matix a(i, j) = 1 ⇐⇒ i, j ∈ E, and zero otherwise. Note
that typically a(i, i) = 0,∀i. In case of undirected network the adjacency matrix is
necessarily symmetric, since if a(i, j) = 1 then also a(j, i) = 1. It is possible to give
weights to the links, assigning them a value and creating a weighted matrix B with
positive entries b(i, j) related to non-zero elements a(j, i) in the adjacency matrix.
Netowrk models In the last fifty years a number of theories of network forma-
tion have been developed in order to generate networks with given characteristics.
Between others, the most famous are the Erdos and Re´nyi (1960) random graph, the
Watts and Strogatz (1998) small world network and the Baraba´si and Albert (1999)
scale free network. We now present the Erdos and Re´nyi random graph, which is
the one adopted in the present work.
The random graph model, of which the figure below shows an example, can be en-
tirely defined by two parameters, the number of nodes N and the probability of
forming a link p.
Figure 5.2: Random graph
In such graph the density is equal to the probability p and the robability that each
node has degree k is a Binomial distribution (i.e. probability of getting k successes
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out of i.d.d. N − 1 Bernoulli trials).
p(k) =
(
N − 1
k
)
pk(1− p)N−k−1 (5.1)
One of the property of the random graph is that, identifying with d the mean degree
of a random graph, for N → ∞ and N · p(N) → d, the binomial distribution tend
to a Poisson(d), thus
p(k) =
e−d
d
k
k! (5.2)
That is why Erdos Re´ny random graph are often called Poisson random graph.
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